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Financial statecraft and transaction costs: the case of renminbi 
internationalization 
Marina Zucker Marques a* 
The scholarly debate on currency internationalization focuses on country 
characteristics and policies as the main determinants in currency competition. 
However, this literature has neglected the fact that, given the intertwined nature 
of the international monetary system, other countries’ actions and the functioning 
logic of international finance can also impact a currency's international status. 
This article shows that RMB usage has been boosted not only by Chinese 
statecraft but also by economic actors’ recent difficulties in using the dollar. The 
American financial sanctions against Chinese trade partners, the cyclical 
instability of international finance, as well as peripheral countries' low inflows of 
dollars have encouraged firms and banks to use the renminbi as an alternative to 
the dollar. In addition to contributing to a broader understanding of the drivers of 
currency internationalization, this article proposes a model that explains the 
mechanisms that push firms and banks away from the incumbent international 
currency. I posit that changes in domestic and international conditions influence 
currency transaction costs, thereby propelling economic actors to increase their 
use of currencies with relatively lower transaction costs. Interviews with Chinese 
senior officials from the PBOC and the Ministry of Commerce, manufacturing 
companies, and bank staff are the main primary sources for this article. I 
triangulate this information with news reports and speeches both in Chinese and 
English. 
Keywords: International monetary system, renminbi internationalization, financial 
statecraft, dollar, currency competition 
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There are over 160 domestic currencies in the world,1 but only a handful of them 
also play the role of a unit of account, medium of exchange, and store of value 
beyond their jurisdiction, and therefore can be considered international currencies 
(Cohen, 1971). The dollar is by far the most widely adopted international currency 
(see graph 1), but to a lesser degree, the euro, the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc, the 
British pound, and most recently the renminbi, are also adopted for international 
transactions. 
Graph 1. Asymmetry of currency adoption in the international monetary system. 
Source: IMF, SWIFT, BIS. Note: *Including intra-European transactions; **Because two currencies are 
involved in each transaction, the sum of the percentage shares of individual currencies totals 200% 
instead of 100%. 
There are many advantages to being at the top of the international monetary hierarchy; 
from the economic point of view, international seigniorage gains, macroeconomic 
flexibility, and price stability are the most cited (Cohen, 2012; Eichengreen, 2011; 
Gopinath, 2015; Papaioannou and Portes, 2008; Zhang and Tao, 2014). In addition, 
issuing countries can increase their political leverage and international reputation 
(Cohen, 2012; Helleiner, 2008; Helleiner and Kirshner, 2009; Kirshner, 1995; Norrlof, 
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2014; Strange, 1971). But the international monetary hierarchy is highly path-
dependent, so any new entrant to the hall of international currencies faces an uphill 
battle (Eichengreen et al., 2005; Matsuyama et al., 1993). 
Despite this challenge, international use of the renminbi has expanded by an 
unprecedented degree. Between 2010 and 2019, the renminbi climbed from the world's 
35th to the 5th most used payment currency (SWIFT, 2020). During the same period, 
cross-border renminbi payments increased from 630 billion to 15.86 trillion renminbi, 
and currently, over 25% of Chinese cross-border payments are denominated in this 
currency. Moreover, by 2020, more than 70 central banks held renminbi-denominated 
assets in their portfolio (PBOC, 2020). To date, there is no consensus about the drivers 
behind renminbi internationalization, despite extensive investigation (Bowles and 
Wang, 2013; Eichengreen and Kawai, 2014; Prasad, 2017; Subacchi, 2016; Yu, 2014). 
As Eichengreen and Kawai put it: “whether wider international use of the RMB is a 
spontaneous market reaction or a manifestation of the PRC’s growing ability and 
willingness to influence the shape and structure of the global economy is a matter of 
interpretation” (Eichengreen and Kawai, 2014 p.3).  
Most puzzlingly, data on cross-border payments between China and the rest of 
the world show that the expansion of the renminbi has largely come at the expense of 
the dollar’s market share. Although the absolute volume of dollar transactions between 
China and the rest of the world has increased during the period analyzed, its market 






Graph 2. Changes in RMB cross-border payments and currency market share 
substitution, 2010-19, (% of total cross-border payments) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE). 
Given the inertia the international monetary system, and the supremacy of the dollar's 
status, why did economic actors decide to switch from dollars to renminbi in this 
period? This article sheds light on this question by collecting in-depth information about 
actors’ decision-making on currency adoption. I draw on 13 semi-structured open-ended 
interviews with commercial and development banks, manufacturing companies from 
light and heavy industries as well as senior Chinese policymakers from the central bank 
and the Ministry of Commerce, which were collected during fieldwork in China in 2018 
and 2019. I triangulate this information with surveys, news reports, and leadership 
speeches both in Chinese and English. 
The interviews conducted show that, although PBOC policies contribute to the rising 
use of the renminbi, they are not the only driver. For many firms and banks, the 
difficulty in accessing dollar services encouraged them and their commercial partners to 
use the renminbi as an alternative. Specifically, interviewed actors reported the 
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American financial sanctions on their commercial partners as a key obstacle. Moreover, 
the dollar's cyclical liquidity shortage in foreign markets,2 as well as limited dollar 
inflows to peripheral countries, were also acknowledged as an important reason for 
switching to renminbi transactions. 
In addition to systematically identifying economic and political drivers that encouraged 
actors to substitute the renminbi for the dollar, this article also proposes a model that 
explains the mechanisms that compel economic agents to switch from an incumbent 
international currency to a new entrant. The model was developed inductively based on 
primary material collected during fieldwork, and is also informed by insights from the 
economic literature on transaction costs (Eichengreen et al., 2005; Krugman, 1984; 
Matsuyama et al., 1993). The model highlights that changes in currency transaction 
costs, influenced by changes in domestic and international conditions, impel economic 
agents to increase their use of currencies with relatively lower transaction costs.   
This article contributes to two debates on the international political economy. 
The first one concerns the role of financial statecraft (FS) (Armijo and Katada, 2015; 
Katada et al., 2017) and the state use of financial and monetary leverage to achieve 
foreign policy goals. According to Armijo and Katada’s (2015) systematization, 
financial statecraft can be classified as offensive or defensive depending on whether the 
primary goal is, respectively, to influence foreign states, market conditions, and 
governance regime, or to create domestic policy space. Moreover, FS can be 
 
2 In this article, the term “dollar shortage" refers to the difficulty of actors obtaining dollar 
credits because of lenders' changes in liquidity preference. It does not refer to the scarcity of 
dollar assets resulting from American chronic current account surpluses during the post-war 




characterized as bilateral or systemic according to whether it is targeted at specific 
nations or on altering conditions in the overall international system.  
Although renminbi internationalization can be placed within these categories, it also 
illustrates something else: it is an example of what happens when the financial statecraft 
of different countries collides. Specifically, Chinese statecraft is an attempt to neutralize 
the effect of American statecraft, although the latter was not explicitly aimed at China.  
 This article also contributes to work on the political economy of networks 
(Farrell and Newman, 2019; de Goede, 2020), which sheds light on how powerful states 
can use global networks—such as payment and message systems, the internet, supply 
chains—to coerce others. Although this literature stream does include consideration of 
vulnerable actors’ responses to coercion, it is largely focused on the state’s responses. 
Here, I present an empirical case where an alternative network was created bottom-up 
and developed organically with the active participation of non-state actors. Although 
this process was authorized by Chinese policymakers, banks and firms took the lead in 
creating a payment alternative that could bypass the American sanctions targeted at 
their commercial partners.  
This article is organised as follows: after the introduction, I first show how 
economists have adopted the concept of transaction costs to analyze international 
currency status, and then I demonstrate that this concept can be useful for a systematic 
understanding of the political economic aspects of currency competition. The third 
section presents the research design and the model that captures the actors' decisions 
about switching from a dominant international currency to a new entrant, the renminbi, 
using the concept discussed. Sections 4 and 5 contain the empirical part of the study. I 
first present evidence of how Chinese policies have reduced renminbi transaction costs 
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and then how American statecraft and the cyclical instability of international finance 
have increased the dollar’s transaction costs. The final section concludes. 
2. The mechanisms of international currency competition 
The literature on international currencies is split between the authors who argue the 
international monetary system tends to unipolarity (Kindleberger, 1967; Krugman, 
1984; Matsuyama et al., 1993) and those who defend the claim that a multicurrency 
system is possible (Eichengreen et al., 2018). What is beyond dispute between the two 
groups is that the existence of transaction costs is the main force behind the tendency 
towards concentration on one currency.  
According to the first group (also referred to as the “traditional” or the 
“Harvard” view), the international monetary system only has room for one currency 
because the economic size of the leading economy and a its currency's high trading 
volume dramatically reduces the costs of operating in that currency.  In Kindleberger’s 
(1967, p. 11) words: “[…] for better or worse […] the choice of which language or 
which currency is made not on merit, or moral worth, but on size”. This view argues 
that diversifying currency use becomes prohibitively costly for everyone. For the 
authors subscribing to this view, the impact of the scale of operations in reducing 
transaction costs is so strong and self-reinforcing that it leads to a “winner takes all” 
effect and inertia in the use of a key currency.  
The second view (referred to as the “new” or “Berkeley” view) also accounts for 
the importance of market forces in reducing a currency’s transaction costs. But these 
authors recognized that, in addition to the scale of operations, technological 
development—such as high-speed communication—and the existence of future markets 
can reduce the cost of exchanging currencies. Moreover, for the “Berkeley” view, 
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market forces are less self-reinforcing, therefore, more domestic currencies can be 
adopted internationally at the same time (Eichengreen et al., 2018).  
Although the “new” view amplifies the factors reducing international currency 
transaction costs, such factors are still narrowly defined, and the the state's role is 
almost an afterthought.  While the “traditional” view relies on the “invisible hand” for 
its explanation, the “new” view is still hesitant in grasping the impact of state actors' 
actions.  
Recent studies have started to shed light on more aspects that shape the 
transaction costs of currencies abroad and how states play a role in this process. For 
example, Rhee and Sumulong (2014) show that the construction of an adequate 
payment infrastructure can reduce the costs of bilateral exchange between non-US 
dollar currencies, thus eliminating the need to use the dollar to triangulate the operation. 
Other examples of how policymakers can shape the transaction costs of currencies are 
provided by Bahaj and Reis (2020) and Eichengreen and Flandreau (2012). They show 
(for the renminbi and the dollar respectively) that central banks can create institutional 
arrangements that reduce the cost of credit abroad and therefore jumpstart the use of 
their currencies.  
Governments can also (intentionally or not) increase the cost of using their 
currency abroad. Cohen (2019) gives historical evidence that Germany in the 1960s and 
Japan in the 1980s tried to actively prevent the international use of their currencies by 
impeding non-residents' access to local banking and capital markets, imposing complex 
regulations, and levying taxes. Recently, although not deliberately, US foreign policy 
actions—i.e., sanctions on oil-rich countries—have also increased the expected costs of 




Apart from economic size and trading volume, there are many other economic 
and political factors shaping currency transaction costs, as demonstrated by the work of 
Rhee and Sumulong (2014), McDowell (2020), Bahaj and Reis (2020), Eichengreen and 
Flandreau (2012), and Cohen (2019), . But, until now, these factors have only been 
analyzed individually. The first contribution of this article is to systematize the relevant 
variables and present a model that incorporates those variables altogether into a 
coherent analysis.  
Furthermore, this article makes a contribution by giving attention to the 
intertwined nature of the international monetary system. Previous studies have focused 
on how country characteristics and policies affect the status of their currencies (Bahaj 
and Reis, 2020; Cohen, 2019; Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2012; McDowell, 2020). 
There are exceptions, such as Eichengreen et al. (2005), who explain the “original sin” 
(that is, the difficulty for small countries of issuing foreign debt in local currency) and 
the concentration of foreign debt in few currencies more as a result of aspects of the 
international monetary system than of an individual country’s characteristics or policies. 
This article contributes to the debate by identifying other external forces that do not 
drive currency concentration, but rather dissipation. In particular, I focus on how other 
countries' actions and the functioning logic of the international monetary system have 
contributed to increasing renminbi cross-border use. To be sure, Farrell and Newman 
(2018) have suggested that the American sanctions on Iran could impel countries to use 
substitutes, especially the euro. This article not only shows empirically that American 
statecraft has indeed pressured actors to look to the euro and the renminbi as 
alternatives, but also shows how the cyclical instability of finance and the limited 
inflow of dollars in peripheral countries can enhance the status of a new entrant 
currency, such as the renminbi.  
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3. Actor’s choice of international currencies  
Although countries may want to promote their currencies, ultimately, the decision on 
which currency to adopt lies with firms and banks (Cohen, 2019; Cohen, 2015; 
Eichengreen et al., 2005). Even in countries like China that have stronger public sector 
participation in the economy, governments do not manage such micro-level decisions. 
As such, based on the concept of transaction costs—which is prominent in the debate on 
currency internationalization—and on the access to a country’s payment system, the 
following section models actors’ decision making when switching from an already 
adopted currency (henceforth incumbent) to a new one (new entrant). 
3.1. Research design  
Most articles that provide economic models build them from empirical quantitative 
data. Given the nature of the phenomenon investigated here, this article will not follow 
this conventional research design, for it is not possible to satisfactorily quantify 
variations in a currency’s transaction costs, nor firms' access to national payment 
systems. Therefore, this article’s model design is based on grounded theory (GT). 
Broadly speaking, this methodology establishes guidelines for a systematic comparison 
of qualitative data, and the inductive development of theories (Glaser and Strauss, 
2017). Although grounded theory is not widespread in economic research, Finch (2002) 
and Lee (2005) advocate for broader use of this methodology in the field. According to 
Finch (2002, p. 214), “Grounded theory procedures provide a basis for economists to 
make effective use of case studies, and of qualitative and quantitative data in general, by 
connecting case studies together in order to generalize, and in so doing verify, emerging 
novel contributions to knowledge”. 
In terms of data, the construction of this model is based on primary data 
collected during fieldwork in Shanghai, Beijing, Hangzhou, and Guangdong in 2018 
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and 2019. For this article, I use information from 13 interviews with individuals 
including senior officials from the Chinese central bank (the PBOC) and the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM), representatives of commercial banks (Bank of China, Bank of 
Communications, China Construction Bank, and Bank of Kunlun), development banks 
(China Development Bank, and New Development Bank), as well representatives of 
light and heavy manufacturing companies.3 I followed a process of theoretical sampling 
for controlled data collection (Glaser 1978). The objective was to cover a broad variety 
of economic actors in order to understand diverse motives for international currency 
choice. The sampling strategy was snowballing (Creswell and Poth, 2018): from initial 
contacts with academics and the business community I reached the abovementioned 
interviewees. The sampling size was determined based on the GT principle of  
“theoretical saturation”, which is when the researcher carries on with subsequent 
interviews until the point that they no longer contribute to the model's development 
(Finch, 2002). All the interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions. I 
triangulate and complement this primary data with surveys, speeches from the firms’ 
leadership, news, reports, and secondary literature on currency internationalization in 
English and Chinese.  
3.2. A model for international currency`s choice 
I posit that there is a higher probability of an economic actor reducing, or abandoning, 
the use of an incumbent currency when its relative transaction costs increase. It is 
possible to explain this decision in the form of the following basic equation, where TC 
stands for transaction costs:  
 
 
3 A list of the interviews can be found in the appendix. 
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 (1)                   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 =  




If this ratio decreases, ceteris paribus, there is a higher probability that firms and 
banks will avoid using the given incumbent currency. If this proportion increases or 
remains the same, actors will continue using the incumbent currency. It is important to 
emphasize that this is a matter of probability, so even if this ratio increases because the 
transaction costs of the incumbent currency have increased, it is still possible that some 
actors will just accept the higher transaction costs and continue with operations in the 
vehicle currency. 
The probability of an actor switching to the new entrant currency also varies 
depending on the actor's characteristics. In my interviews, two main aspects were 
relevant: actors’ nationality, and the location of the foreign trade or investment partner. 
When the actor is from a country that issues the newcomer currency, they are more 
responsive to small changes in the relative transaction costs of that currency. So, a 
Chinese firm is more susceptible to switch to renminbi operations when the renminbi 
relative transaction costs decrease than a British company, even if the British company 
operates in China. The reasons for this discrepancy lie in the accounting system, debt, 
and revenue structures of each company. Finally, those companies that have trading or 
investment partners in countries that have difficulty accessing the payment system of 
the incumbent currency country will have strong incentives to abandon or reduce the 
use of this currency. 
Now that the firm’s calculus is explained, let us consider the main factors 
shaping currency transaction costs:  
(2)              𝑇𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  (𝑇𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝑇𝐶𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑆 
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The first type of transaction cost has been more studied by the literature on 
currency internationalization. Pecuniary transaction costs include fees, commissions, 
interest, bid-ask spreads, etc., in sum, all direct monetary costs related to the cross-
border use of a currency. The second type, time transaction costs, refers to how fast 
firms have access to their assets. The speed of cross-border transfers and the completion 
of foreign exchange-related bureaucratic tasks are the main components of this 
category.  
A decisive component of a currency's transaction costs is whether foreign firms 
can access the payment system denominated in that currency. When foreigners cannot 
access the payment system, then the cost of accessing it tends to infinity. In this case, 
even if the pecuniary and time transaction costs are very low, the overall transaction 
costs tend to infinity. As the empirical part of this study will demonstrate, this is the 
case, for example, for Chinese companies trading with Iranian firms. Undoubtedly, the 
dollars pecuniary and time transaction costs are very low, but it does not matter because 
Iran is basically excluded from the dollar payment system. Therefore, in this case, the 
total dollar transaction costs tend to infinity. In this situation, even if the renminbi 
pecuniary, time, and information transaction costs are not as low as the dollar’s, Iranian 
firms can at least access the renminbi payment system, so the total renminbi transaction 
costs will be much cheaper compared to those of the dollar. 
Until 2009, the total transaction costs of cross-border renminbi use also tended 
towards infinity because, as I show in in section 4.1 of this article, until that year, 
Chinese banks could not offer renminbi correspondent bank accounts to foreign banks, 
and the Cross-Border Inter-Bank Payments System (CIPS) did not exist. Therefore, 
until 2009, the total renminbi transaction costs relative to the dollar tended towards 
infinity, and the use of the dollar for cross-border transactions was the best option. The 
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following section will show empirically how the transaction costs of the renminbi have 
reduced since 2009 while those of the dollar have increased. 
4. Chinese statecraft, reducing the transaction costs of cross-border renminbi 
use 
Renminbi internationalization is mostly a company behaviour, government only 
gives some encouragement. (Excerpt from interview with a former director of 
department from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce,4 emphasis added) 
 
We are not pushing for the international use of the renminbi; we are giving support 
to market participants interested in adopting it. (Excerpt from interview with 
senior PBOC official,5 emphasis added) 
The above excerpts from interviews with Chinese officials illustrate the policymakers’ 
approach to renminbi internationalization policies: they favor facilitating the conditions 
for market participants to adopt renminbi for cross-border transactions. As the following 
subsections will show empirically, designated policies facilitated renminbi adoption by 
1) enabling non-residents to access the Chinese payment system, 2) reducing pecuniary 
transaction costs, and 3) reducing time transaction costs.   
4.1 Access to the Payment system 
Whether a non-resident can access the Chinese payment system is a crucial element for 
renminbi cross-border use. One interviewee,6 a Bank of China director, observes: “If a 
location is able or not to accept renminbi is a very important condition. If there is no 
possibility to open a renminbi account, how are they going to receive renminbi?”. 
 
4 Beijing, October 2019. Own translation from Chinese. 
5 Senior Official, Shanghai, November 2018. 
6 Shanghai, September 2019. Own translation from Chinese. 
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For the last 30 years, China has been integrated into the world economy, and 
into the dollar payment system.7 However, foreign banks’ connection to the renminbi-
denominated payment system is a recent phenomenon that has its roots in the Pilot 
Program of Renminbi Settlement of Cross-border Trade Transactions issued by the 
PBOC in conjunction with other authorities in 2009. For the first time, banks in China 
could offer renminbi-denominated correspondent bank accounts to overseas financial 
institutions, thereby enabling those institutions to make renminbi-denominated 
transactions for themselves and on behalf of their clients. The same program also 
selected the Bank of China’s Hong Kong and Macau branches to be the first renminbi 
offshore clearing centers, thus giving overseas financial institutions the possibility to 
directly access the mainland’s payment system from abroad (PBOC et. al, 2009).  
Since the pilot program was implemented, an additional 24 renminbi offshore 
clearing banks have been established covering the 5 continents, as appendix 1 shows. 
Also, since 2009, renminbi-denominated correspondent bank accounts have surged in 
number. From 2010 to 2012, Hong Kong’s correspondent banking relations 
denominated in renminbi increased from 200 to 1.100 accounts, as disclosed by the 
region’s monetary authority (Yu, 2012). Bank of China, the country’s largest 
commercial bank, reported that by 2014 alone they had offered over 1200 renminbi 
correspondent bank accounts to overseas banks (He, 2014). More recent and 
comprehensive research from the consulting group Accuity shows the same tendency. 
Between 2012 and 2016 the worldwide number of RMB correspondent bank accounts 
increased from 3,600 to 8,800 (Accuity, 2017).   
 
7 It is estimated that the Clearing House Payment Company (CHIPS) is responsible for handling 
95% of cross-border dollar transactions (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2002). By 




Not only did the number of correspondent bank accounts and clearing banks 
expand, but the PBOC also created a new and more efficient channel to connect non-
residents to China’s payment system. In 2015, the PBOC launched the Cross-border 
Interbank Payment System (CIPS), which streamlines the transmission of payment 
messages and funds. With good reason, it is referred to by PBOC officials as the 
“highway” to renminbi internationalization (CIPS, 2021; PBOC, 2018b). 
Chinese policymaking follows a logic of gradualism and experimentation 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2017);  regarding renminbi internationalization policies, the same 
rationale was applied. Although non-residents could open a renminbi account as early as 
2009, the use of these accounts was restricted. In 2009, only 365 firms, from Shanghai 
and the Pearl River Delta metropolitan area, exporting to partners from ASEAN 
regions, could use renminbi for cross-border transactions. Over time, Chinese 
authorities expanded the geographical scope and the type of transactions allowed in 
these programs. By 2013, all domestic companies could use renminbi for trade 
payments and for FDI, and banks could offer renminbi loans to projects abroad. In 
addition, in late 2011, China created the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investor program (RQFII) which, by a quota mechanism, gradually granted access to 
the mainland’s capital markets for foreign investors (Central Government Portal, 2009; 
PBOC et. al, 2013, 2012, 2009; Prasad, 2017). 
Although China’s capital account opening process is not yet complete (Miao and 
Deng, 2020), and the international reach of the renminbi’s payment system still pales in 
comparison to the dollar's,8 the fact is that within 6 years China has constructed 
 
8 By 2016, the number of renminbi correspondent bank accounts overseas represented roughly 
10% of the dollar's (Accuity 2017). The number of CIPS participants is 5 times lower than 
its American analogue, the CHIPS. 
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channels that allow non-residents to access the mainland’s payment system. This 
initiative was crucial to enable economic actors to adopt renminbi. 
4.2 Pecuniary transaction costs 
The possibility of using renminbi for cross-border operations does not by itself ensure 
that actors would switch to this currency. The firms and banks interviewed decided to 
adopt the renminbi because doing so reduces pecuniary and time transaction costs; this 
section focuses on the former type. Specifically, the primary sources collected show 
three types of pecuniary costs that could be diminished or even avoided: currency 
hedging, credit, and commissions and fees. In addition to the Renminbi Settlement of 
Cross-border Trade Transactions program, which started as a pilot scheme in 2009, 
other policies have also contributed to the reduction of renminbi pecuniary transaction 
costs, as this section shows in detail.  
4.2.1 Exchange rate risk and hedging cost 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, firms and banks do not have to hedge against 
exchange rate risks. This was the case for Chinese actors from 1994 to 2005 while the 
renminbi was pegged to the dollar. In 2005, Chinese policymakers started to allow 
renminbi daily fluctuations within a range that started with 0.3% and evolved to 2% 
over time. Since 2015, in addition to daily fluctuations, the PBOC also started tolerating 
broader accumulated fluctuations (China Daily, 2015; Das, 2019). It is not coincidence 
that, between May and November 2020, the CNY/USD exchange rate oscillated 
between 7.12 and 6.57 (data from the China Foreign Exchange Trading Center). 
Under the current regulations, it is much more important for some companies to 
find ways to protect themselves from exchange rate fluctuations. One strategy is to sign 
forward or option contracts, but it comes with a fee. From some firms’ point of view, 
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adopting the renminbi for cross-border transactions is a costless way to gain protection 
from foreign exchange fluctuation. This motive for adopting the renminbi was 
mentioned in 6 interviews.9 
“When renminbi cross-border settlements started to be allowed”, explains an 
interviewee from a pet products supplier, 10 “we locked our prices in renminbi and 
asked some of our foreign customers to pay in renminbi. In this way, we could avoid 
exchange rate changes, which have caused some unexpected losses and gains for us”. 
She explained that some clients still pay in dollars but then “we [interviewed company] 
sign a forward contract with the bank to lock the dollar price. This means we have to 
pay a fee and keep a deposit at the bank to guarantee the contract”. 
Hedging against exchange rates was also an important motive for currency 
choice in bank loans, as an interviewee from the New Development Bank reported:11 
We are interested in lending in local currency because we do not want our clients 
dealing with currency risks. Many of our clients have local revenue and long-term 
projects. As much as possible, we want them to be able to mitigate this huge risk. 
One of the solutions is to issue credits in the client’s currency because the bank 
cannot take that risk either. We have to avoid this currency mismatch in our books, 
so we neutralize our risk exposure by issuing and lending the same amount in the 
same currency. 
In 2019, a survey conducted by the PBOC with 500 enterprises operating in 
China (including foreign-owned firms) shows that the main reason for companies 
 
9 With 1) accountant from pet products supply company, Shanghai, September 2019; 2) analyst 
from China Construction Bank, Shanghai September 2019; 3) research analyst from Bank 
of Communications, Shanghai September 2019; 4) senior official from New Development 
Bank, Shanghai September 2019; 5) senior official from People’s Bank of China, 
Shanghai November 2018; 6) former director of department from Ministry of Commerce, 
Beijing October 2019. 
 
10 Shanghai, September 2019. Own Translation from Chinese. 
11 Senior Official, Shanghai September 2019. Own translation from Portuguese. 
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choosing renminbi cross-border payments was “mitigating foreign exchange risks”, as 
65% of respondents chose this option (PBOC, 2020). A similar pattern was found in the 
survey conducted with 3,900 Europe-based corporate clients that have business interests 
in Asia. In the same year, 73% of the participant firms indicated that currency hedging 
played an important factor in using the renminbi (Commerzbank, 2019). 
4.2.3 Credit cost 
“From a commercial bank perspective, I think there are two aspects for currency use: 
first is the currency our clients need to use, and the second is the credit cost of 
currencies” (own emphasis).  This excerpt from an interview with a Bank of China 
director illustrates one more aspect considered by economic actors when choosing a 
currency, namely, the interest rate.12 
Interest rates are not homogenous among currencies. As de Paula et al. (2017) 
explain, the currencies of peripheral countries tend to have higher interest rates when 
compared to those of central countries. According to the authors, the reason behind this 
pattern is the lower liquidity premium and the higher exchange rate volatility in 
peripheral countries, which compel policymakers to increase the domestic interest rate 
in order to attract foreign capital.  
The structurally higher interest rate of peripheral economies, as well as 
impacting their employment, output, and debt levels, also reinforces their currency’s 
subordinated position in the international monetary hierarchy. As interviews with bank 
representatives have shown, under ordinary macroeconomic circumstances, it may be 
more advantageous to take a loan in hard currencies and sign a forward contract to gain 
protection from exchange rate volatility, rather than to use domestic currencies directly. 
 
12 Shanghai, September 2019. Own translation from Chinese. 
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As a senior official from the New Development Bank noted, “Although we are 
interested in using local currencies, in many cases it is beneficial to lend and borrow in 
dollars. Given our bank’s rating,13 we can issue dollar debt at a very competitive interest 
rate and transmit this advantage to local clients”. According to one interviewee,14 a 
director from Bank of China, exchange rate tendencies can even amplify the advantage 
of using hard currencies: “under the situation of renminbi devaluation expectation, 
offering a loan in the dollar and making a forward or swap contract is the cheaper 
option for the client”.  
Under other conditions, however, the advantages of taking hard currency credit 
disappear. The cost and availability of credit are intrinsically connected to the cyclical 
character of capitalist economies. While actors experience easing in financial conditions 
during expansionary phases of the cycle, in bust phases interest rates soar and 
borrowing opportunities shrink (Borio, 2012; Kindleberger, 1978; Minsky, 2016). 
According to an interviewee who is a PBOC senior official in Beijing,15 the seed of 
renminbi internationalization lies in the credit crunch for hard currencies during the 
2008 crisis: 
Initially we did not plan the renminbi internationalization. It was an opportunity 
that emerged from the global financial crisis. By the time, the PBOC was contacted 
by many central banks and some governments because the foreign exchange rate of 
the USD and euro has depreciated by 10% or 20%. So, the market was very short 
of liquidity in USD and Euros, many companies and governments needed liquidity 
and they see at the time RMB was a fairly stable and strong currency. They 
contacted the PBOC to allow them to use the RMB (own emphasis). 
 
13The Japan Credit Rating Agency assigned AAA to New Development Bank’s long-term 
issuing, which is higher than some individual member countries' credit rating. 
14 Shanghai, September 2019. Own translation form Chinese. 
15 Beijing, October 2019. 
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According to another interviewed PBOC senior official from Shanghai,16 allowing 
the cross-border transaction of renminbi was a solution designed to support trade during 
times of constrained international financial conditions; as he put it, “with the dollar 
shortage of the period, trading directly in a local currency supported the maintenance of 
trade and investment relations with commercial partners”. 
Chinese policymakers cannot mitigate the cyclical instability of foreign currencies in 
international markets. Nonetheless, as interviews with PBOC senior officials 
demonstrate, in a constrained macroeconomic situation they could provide the renminbi 
as an alternative for cross-border transactions. Over time, the PBOC has also built 
overseas institutions—namely, swap agreements and renminbi offshore clearing 
centers—which ease renminbi credit constraints abroad and smooth its credit 
cyclicality.   
Currency swap agreements establish credit lines between central banks.  By the 
end of 2020, China had negotiated 39 of these agreements, with a total value of 3.7 
trillion RMB (PBOC, 2020).  
Different from the FED swap agreements, which were designed specifically for 
financial market stability, officially the PBOC swap lines were also designed to 
facilitate trade and investment in renminbi (PBOC, 2020). As an interviewee from the 
Bank of Communications,17 one of the five largest commercial banks in China, 
explains:  
Until now, one problem that exists specially in regions like east-Asian countries, 
when we sell products there is no way to use RMB for settlement if there is no 
SWAP agreement between China and the country. There is not enough renminbi to 
settle the transaction if they do not have enough RMB reserves. Having the 
 
16 November 2018. 
17 Research analyst, Shanghai September 2019. Own translation from Chinese. 
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renminbi swap agreement helps bringing more convenience when carrying out 
trade and investment in RMB. 
Song and Xia (2020) and Bahaj and Reis (2020) show that there is a correlation 
between signing a PBOC swap agreement and using renminbi for cross-border 
payments (measured by SWIFT messages). Bahaj and Reis (2020) find that signing 
renminbi swaps increases the probability of a country using RMB by 20%. For the 
authors, such arrangements increase renminbi liquidity abroad and set a ceiling for 
working capital credit cost abroad.  An interview with a PBOC senior official gives 
more evidence of the swap role as a liquidity supplier:18 “Swap agreement is mainly for 
confidence […] telling the markets that […] [it] does not matter how much your 
demand is, I have this line of credit from PBOC, and they can provide us with RMB”. 
Swap agreements are not the only arrangements that can ease renminbi credit 
conditions overseas. In addition to serving as a gateway to the mainland’s payment 
system, as section 4.1 explains, renminbi offshore clearing banks can also help to put a 
ceiling on renminbi credit cost abroad. This is because—similarly to foreign central 
banks that sign swap agreements—renminbi offshore clearing banks also have access to 
PBOC liquidity. According to one interviewed senior PBOC official,19 “When they 
[clearing banks] need liquidity, they can come to us (PBOC), and then we can provide 
RMB liquidity directly to them”. Moreover, renminbi offshore clearing bank activities 
can also reduce the bid-ask spread of renminbi assets negotiated in offshore markets. As 
explained by the same PBOC senior official, offshore clearing banks act as “a market 
maker, a liquidity provider for the local market, for the renminbi”.  
 
18 Beijing, October 2019. 




Exempting overseas investors from fees and taxes is another approach used by Chinese 
policymakers to encourage renminbi desirability. For instance, in November 2018, 
China’s State Administration of Taxation exempted overseas institutional investors 
from bond market taxes for 3 years. According to the authorities, the goal was to push 
forward the opening-up of China’s bond market (Liangyu, 2018). This decision makes 
renminbi-denominated investments, which already offer higher yields compared to 
those in advanced economies, even more profitable.  
Foreign central banks willing to hold renminbi assets in their portfolios also 
receive pecuniary incentives. As explained by an interviewed PBOC senior official,20  
central banks that issue international reserve currencies offer asset management services 
to other central banks, governments, and international organizations. For instance, if 
Korea has dollar-denominated reserves, they are maintained by the FED, but if they are 
in renminbi, the administration is carried out by the PBOC. However, according to the 
PBOC senior official, “Differently from other central banks, like the FED, we [the 
PBOC] do not charge them [other central banks and international organizations] for this 
service [reserve management]. Added to that, we offer one of the best return rates of the 
market.” Although it is not plausible that central banks, foreign governments, and 
international organizations would decide to hold renminbi-denominated reserves purely 
because fees are not charged, nevertheless, considering other factors altogether—such 
as Chinese government bonds high returns and renminbi inclusion in SDR21—the 
omission of these fees brings additional advantages to renminbi holders.  
 
20 Shanghai. October 2018. 
21 3,7% p.a. at the time of the interview. 
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According to PBOC (2020) information, by December 2019, at least 70 foreign 
central banks held renminbi assets in their portfolio. Although the total volume 
represents a small fraction of worldwide reserves—2.13% in September 2020, 
according to IMF—from December 2016 until September 2020, this volume increased 
by 2.7 times.22 
Using renminbi was able to diminish operation fees not only because of waived 
exemptions for foreign investors but also because of the new currency pairs offered in 
China’s interbank market, which allowed actors to reduce their costs from conversion 
fees. 
 Before 2010, if any firm or bank wanted to trade RMB for a non-USD currency, 
they had no choice but to use the dollar as a vehicle currency, as there was no direct 
trading between RMB and other local currencies, with the exception of the Hong Kong 
dollar. In 2010, this situation was reversed: the renminbi started to be directly quoted 
against the Malaysian ringgit and the Russian ruble in the mainland’s interbank market, 
and soon other currencies followed suit. Between 2011 and 2018, an additional 23 









22 From approximately 90 billion USD (equivalent) in December 2016 to 244 billion USD 
(equivalent) in September 2020, according to IMF/ COFER data.  
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Table 1. Currencies available for RMB direct trading 
Since        Currency  
2010 Malaysian ringgit, Russian ruble 
2011 Vietnamese dong*, Kazakhstani tenge* 
2012 Japanese yen,  
2013 Australian dollar 
2014 New Zealand dollar, Great Britain pound, euro, Singapore dollar,  
2015 Swiss franc 
2016 South African rand, Korean won, Saudi riyal, United Arab Emirates 
dirham, Mexican peso, Turkish lira, Norwegian krone, Swedish krona, 
Danish krone,  Polish zloty,  Hungarian forint, Canadian dollar 
2017  Cambodia riel*, Mongolia tugrik* 
2018  Thai baht 
 Source: CFETS (2021), PBOC (2020). *Regional trade, only available in neighboring 
provinces. 
Having direct quotations between the renminbi and non-USD currencies can lower 
pecuniary transaction costs to investors and traders because they can reduce conversion 
fees (Prasad, 2017). One of the interviewees reported that some of their clients in 
southeast Asia started to adopt renminbi because of this quotation arrangement;23 as he 
put it: “they would need to exchange their currency to a foreign currency anyway.  
According to the Chinese policy, they (clients) could exchange their local currency to 
renminbi and then diminish a bit in exchange fees.” Official information from the Bank 
of Korea (2021) corroborates my interviewee’s statement: 
 as the won-yuan direct trading replaced the previous system of two stage trading, 
consisting of the initial won-dollar trade and the subsequent yuan-dollar trade, 
trading costs fell and big companies took the lead in using the yuan to pay more 
 
23 Former manager in a Chinese ship building company, Shanghai, November 2018. Own 
translation from Chinese. 
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trade settlements, which also raised the ratio of yuan-based payments for trade 
settlements to China. (own emphasis).  
For some currencies, such as the Thai baht, conversion fees were even eliminated. To 
encourage the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),24 Chinese policymakers decide to remove 
renminbi-Thai baht trading fees for 30 months (CFETS, 2018). 
Table 2. Direct trade RMB to non-USD currencies on the Chinese foreign 
exchange spot market.  
 
Source: PBOC (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018a, 2019, 2020) 
As table 2 shows, the trading between RMB and non-USD still represents a small 
fraction of overall foreign exchange transactions. Nonetheless, including new currency 
pairs in the foreign exchange market allows actors to reduce pecuniary costs, thereby 
encouraging renminbi use. 
4.3 Time transaction costs 
In addition to the reduction of hedging costs, credit costs, and fees, some interviewees 
also reported that saving time was an important consideration when switching to 
 
24 BRI is a Chinese-led initiative which aims at infrastructure development along the route of 
the historic Silk Road. 
Volume 
(trillion yuan)
Ratio of total onshore 
interbank spot market 
(%)
before 2010 n.i less than 0.5%
2014 1.05 4.7                            
2015 1.42 4.6                            
2016 1.13 2.9                            
2017 1.40 3.3                            
2018 1.60 3.2                            
2019 2.30 4.2                            
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renminbi operations. Specifically, adopting the renminbi could result in less time spent 
on bureaucratic tasks, and cross-border payments could be accelerated.  
4.3.1. Reducing bureaucracy  
According to the PBOC survey, the second most-cited reason for companies choosing 
renminbi for cross-border transactions is the “simplification of settlement process”. 
Over 43% of respondents selected this motivation (PBOC 2020).  Interviews25 with 
firms and a bank representative show that, by adopting renminbi, economic actors can 
avoid or at least reduce administrative work related to Chinese foreign exchange 
controls, which otherwise would be much stricter if hard currencies were adopted. 
In China, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is the 
institution responsible for supervising and regulating foreign exchange activities. 
SAFE’s supervisory activities are conducted within commercial banks, which host 
SAFE officials (Sun, 2020). During an interview with an analyst from the state-owned 
commercial bank,26 China Construction Bank, it was explained how SAFE activities 
may affect cross-border operations: “Independently of the currency, SAFE officials 
have to check the authenticity of the operation. But if it is in renminbi, they will not 
control the amount or conduct a more stringent review. So, if the company adopts 
renminbi, payments are received in the account faster”.  
An interviewee, 27 who is a former manager at a Chinese-owned ship building 
company, described SAFE’s foreign exchange settlement process (结汇)，which is 
necessary for companies who receive hard currency as “extremely troublesome”. In his 
 
25 1) Former manager at a Chinese-owned ship building company, Shanghai, November 2018; 
2) CFO at a foreign-owned outsourcing and supply chain company, Zhuhai, October 2018; 
3) analyst at China Construction Bank, Shanghai, September 2019. 
26 September 2019. Own translation from Chinese. 
27 November 2018. Own translation from Chinese. 
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words: “You must enter in a system, then complete a declaration form. You must 
present a schedule for every payment you are supposed to receive. If your client delays 
the payment, you must complete a new declaration form all over again. It requires a lot 
of routine and procedural work. But if you receive in renminbi, then the procedure is 
much simpler” (emphasis added). The impact of China’s foreign exchange controls on 
currency choice was summarized by an interviewed company CFO: 28 “The more and 
more difficult Chinese authorities make it for people accepting dollars, it happens to 
push more and more people to use the renminbi”. 
The use of local currency for cross-border transactions to avoid foreign 
exchange bureaucratic work is not exclusive to the Chinese case. A similar pattern is 
found in South America by Fritz (2018). With the establishment of a regional payment 
system between Brazil and Argentina, some Brazilian firms started to adopt the real 
instead of dollars to avoid the time-consuming procedures established by the monetary 
authority. 
4.3.2 Making fast payments 
As a branch director from the Bank of China explains: “One of the key factors of 
RMB internationalization is the convenience of clearing, with CIPS, the settlement is in 
real-time”. She adds: “CIPS make the transaction more convenient, it speeds the 
liquidation, what is important for clients with high timeliness requirements” (Bank of 
China, 2019). 
As mentioned in section 4.1, until 2015, correspondent banking relations (CBR) 
were the major channel for connecting non-residents to the mainland’s payment system. 
With CBR, however, there were technical barriers that hampered the efficiency of 
 
28 Foreign-owned outsourcing and supply chain company, Zhuhai, October 2018. 
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renminbi cross-border transactions. One of them concerns the incompatibility of 
Chinese characters with SWIFT codes, which is the message network mostly adopted in 
the banking industry. It is not by accident that, in 2013, 15% of renminbi cross-border 
payments were rejected by SWIFT, whereas this rate is only 3% for the dollar. A high 
rate of rejection in financial messages mean that transactions can take longer to 
conclude (Global Capital, 2013). Another issue that delayed renminbi cross-border 
transactions is related to time-zone differences. China Standard Time is eight hours 
ahead of Greenwich Mean Time and thirteen hours ahead of Eastern Standard Time. For 
this reason, there was no overlap between China’s central bank clearing house (CNAPS) 
working hours and European and US business hours, making it impossible to carry out 
same-day transactions with these regions. 
The construction of a Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) solved 
both problems. First, CIPS operates with the internationally accepted ISO20022 
message standard that is compatible with English and Chinese languages. Moreover, 
since CIPS phase-2 was launched in 2018, it operates 24 hours during normal business 
days, covering financial center business hours in all continents. In sum, with CIPS, all 
renminbi cross-border transactions happen in real time. 
Table 3 summarizes the Chinese policy initiatives discussed in this section, and 
their impact on reducing renminbi transaction costs. As interviews with firms and banks 
demonstrated, the possibility of reducing transaction costs was the reason for many 







Table 3- Summary of policies reducing renminbi transaction costs 
Transaction 





Authorize mainland banks to offer renminbi-
denominated correspondent bank accounts to 
overseas financial institutions. 
 
Allow non-residents' financial 
institutions access to the mainland 
payment system. 
 
Allow non-residents to open a 
renminbi-denominated account, 
enabling them to pay and receive 
renminbi 
Establish Renminbi Offshore Clearing Banks 
 





Renminbi trade and investment settlement scheme Avoid currency hedging costs 
The signing of Swap agreements with overseas 
central banks 
Set a ceiling for renminbi credit cost 
overseas 
Establish Renminbi Offshore Clearing Banks 
 
Set a ceiling for renminbi credit cost 
overseas 
 
Reduction of bid-ask spreads for 
renminbi-denominated assets in 
overseas markets 
Tax exemption for institutional investors 
Increase investors’ return Management fee exemption for central banks 
holding renminbi reserves 
Direct trading between renminbi and non-USD 
currencies 





Renminbi trade and investment settlement scheme Reduces time spent on bureaucratic tasks 
Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) Reduces time for the cross-border transfer. Instant payments 
5. The increase of dollar transaction costs 
Although the Chinese policies for reducing renminbi transaction costs are an important 
explanation for the rise of the renminbi in cross-border transactions, they are not the 
only explanatory factor. In the words of an interviewed senior PBOC official: 29 “In the 
use of any currency, there is also a path dependence. If you are used to USD for your 
transaction, you tend to be dependent on it, until you see very much disadvantage to do 
so”.  This section will show some difficulties that actors encounter in dollar cross-
border operations, how these adversities impact the currency transaction costs, and how 
 
29 Beijing, October 2019. 
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actors respond to the dollar's higher transaction costs.   
There are two causes of increases in dollar transaction costs. The first one is the 
American financial sanctions that have limited some countries’ ability to access the 
dollar-based payment system. The second one is related to the cyclical and structural 
dollar shortage in international markets, which makes the dollar's interest rate rise, 
leading to higher pecuniary transaction costs. 
5.1 Limited access to the American payment system 
For a long time, the USA has adopted many forms of economic statecraft to put 
pressure on foreign states. In addition to the traditional sticks, i.e., trade embargos, aid 
suspension, punitive taxation, and the well-known carrots, i.e., subsidies, preferential 
tariffs, investments guarantee, since the beginning of the 21st century, the USA has also 
included financial sanctions in their statecraft toolkit.  These are different from other 
forms of statecraft inasmuch as the successful use of financial sanctions depends on the 
centrality of the dollar in global finance, and on the fact that the key nodes of the 
international payment and message systems are under American jurisdiction.30 In 
practical terms, these conditions allow the USA to freeze accounts or block transfers 
from and to selected countries, banks, firms, or individuals (Drezner, 2019, 2015; 
Farrell and Newman, 2019).  
The Trump administration has escalated the use of financial sanctions, and the 
case of Iran is the prime example of his approach. In 2015, the United Nations Security 
Council signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, popularly 
known as the Iranian nuclear deal, which limited the country’s uranium-enrichment 
 
30 Such as the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) and the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). 
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activities in return for the lifting of financial sanctions. In 2018, however, the USA 
unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, and introduced what the US Department of the 
Treasury called “the toughest U.S. sanctions ever imposed on Iran”. As well as 
restricting Iranian financial institutions from the dollar payment system, the USA has 
also pressured the global provider of the financial message, the SWIFT, to disconnect 
Iranian banks. As a result, Iran is practically banned from the dollar payment system. 
Although formally there are payment channels for humanitarian purposes, many banks, 
afraid they could be fined, adopt the “zero risk” approach and refuse to make any 
transaction with the country (Drezner, 2019; Mallard et al., 2020; U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, 2018).  
In the view of a PBOC senior official interviewed, 31 during the Trump 
administration, the USA “started to weaponize the dollar”. She explains in detail as 
follows: 
They [USA] have the power to impose sanctions because of the US financial 
system dominance in the international monetary system. According to their 
domestic law, their judges can order any financial institution located in the USA to 
provide the necessary information they demand […] These laws have come a long 
way, but they have been rarely used before. But in recent years, especially after 
Trump, I think for the financial society it is very clear they started to weaponize the 
dollar and their financial sanctions against Iran, North Korea…They [USA] have 
the laws, they have the power, any other country is too weak to countermeasure. 
Considering the case of Iran along with 20 other countries that have been 
damaged by the American financial sanctions,32 some scholars have already discussed 
the possibility that the financial sanctions could impact the international status of the 
dollar (Drezner, 2019, 2015; Farrell and Newman, 2019; Farrell and Newman, 2018; 
 
31 Beijing, October 2019. 
32 See the US Department of the Treasury for a complete list of sanctioned countries.  
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McDowell, 2020). So far, this American statecraft has not threatened the dollar 
dominance, but it has produced spillover effects for the adoption of other currencies, 
including the renminbi. Chinese policymakers are aware of this tendency, as a speech 
from a former PBOC vice-governor, Yin Yong, demonstrates:  
We also have seen that due to changes on international geopolitics, in particular 
some countries abusing their currencies dominant positions, seeking unilateral 
benefits, using domestic law to engage in a long-arm jurisdiction, such as imposing 
unilateral international financial sanctions, etc. These practices have prompted 
many countries and regions to turn their eyes to more responsible currencies, and 
the renminbi has also become an option for them ( Sina Finance 2018, own 
translation, emphasis added). 
In order to preserve business opportunities, firms and banks have explored various 
possibilities for making and receiving payments from sanctioned countries. According 
to my fieldwork material, the strategies varied depending on the size and sector of the 
organizations. Smaller businesses tend to find more rudimentary solutions, as was the 
case for an interviewed Chinese-owned manufacturing company33. According to the 
company’s sales staff, the company has Iranian clients but after the escalation of the US 
bilateral sanctions in 2018, it became impossible for their clients to pay directly from 
Iran, so they started to use a neighboring country as a depot for payment transactions. 
At the time of the interview, they declared they were exploring the possibility of 
receiving direct payments in renminbi from Iran. The experience reported by this 
company parallels what is happening on a much larger scale in countries that are 
affected by financial sanctions. Looking to the case of Iran, for example, since the US 
sanctions escalated, networks of cross-border smugglers and money collectors have 
emerged to support the country’s imports and exports (Hafezi, 2019).  
 
33 Sales staff at an industrial pump company, Hangzhou, November 2018. 
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 Bigger companies, such as oil companies, have more sophisticated solutions. 
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), for instance, uses their controlled 
bank, the Bank of Kunlun, to make payments to sanctioned countries. In July 2010, the 
US Treasury barred the Bank of Kunlun from the American payment system due to 
their financial relations with Iranian institutions (Bank of Kunlun, 2010). According to 
an interviewee who is an accounting manager at Bank of Kunlun,34 the American 
treasury’s decision did not prevent the bank from continuing to make transactions with 
Iran, Russia, or other oil and gas exporting countries, because the bank started to rely on 
the euro and the renminbi for cross-border operations. As this manager explained, since 
they were banned from American payment systems, they are not under the jurisdiction 
of American law, and this allows them to continue making transactions with their 
clients as long as this was done in other currencies. He added that sanctioned countries 
that accumulate renminbi claims can either offset them by the value of imported goods 
or accumulate claims on Chinese government bonds. Further, according to the 
interviewee, the Bank of Kunlun's renminbi operations for international transactions is 
an increasing trend.  
There are not many gateways for Chinese companies to access sanctioned 
countries’ payment systems apart from the Bank of Kunlun. According to an 
interviewed PBOC senior official: “In China, the commercial banks are so careful about 
not offending or breaking any rule, because [they know] if they are punished or 
sanctioned without base, China does not have strong enough power to counter the 
measures that the USA would do against us”. An interviewee from the China 
Construction Bank reported that, “we, the big-four, large state-owned banks are not 
allowed to do business with Iran now”. She explained that, in early 2018, a chemical 
 
34 Beijing, November 2019. Own translation form Chinese. 
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company needed a loan to import from Iran, but that because of the tightening of 
sanctions throughout the year, the bank decided to shelve the loan agreement. 
According to her, “Later, I heard the company went through with Bank of Kunlun”. 
 Although the Trump administration has pushed actors to find alternatives to the 
dollar, concerns about relying on this currency are of long-standing for some 
organizations, especially those connected to oil imports, as an interviewee from the 
China Development Bank (CDB) reported.35 In 2005, the CDB started to finance 
imports of commodities, including oil, for Chinese enterprises. As the official 
explained, because of the increased use of sanctions by the US on oil-exporting 
companies, the bank was aware that using the dollar could bring commercial risks. As 
he put it, “using dollars means being at the hands of the US”. So, for more than 10 
years, the bank has been trying to diversify the use of currencies for their foreign 
operations as much as they can, including euro and renminbi loans. However, as the 
official explained, there are limits to the adoption of the renminbi: not all buyers are 
interested in receiving renminbi payments given the still relatively small size of 
renminbi trading in international markets. So, the bank continues to have a large amount 
of dollar operations.  
 It is not only firms, but also commercial banks, and development banks that 
have decided to expand their renminbi use as a solution to the difficulty of accessing the 
dollar system.  As the case of Russia exemplifies, the same pattern can be seen with 
central banks. In 2014, when the US treasury first imposed sanctions on Russia for its 
Crimea operations, Russia started a “de-dollarization” process. Between 2017 and 2018, 
the central bank of Russia completely reallocated its foreign assets portfolio. In 2017, 
 
35 Foreign relations official, Beijing October 2019. 
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Russian USD denominated foreign claims accounted for roughly 50%, which declined 
to a mere 10% in the following year. At the same time, euro-denominated claims 
increased from 26% to 40%, and renminbi-denominated from 4% to 29% (Bank of 
Russia, 2018; McDowell, 2020). 
Although the US use of sanctions has not yet put at risk the dominance of the 
USD, it has impelled states, firms, and banks to look to alternative currencies. The 
possible impact of American statecraft on the euro has already been suggested by 
Farrell and Newman (2018), and the European initiative to create a payment mechanism 
(the INSTEX) to bypass American sanctions has already received some attention in the 
media (Deutsche Welle, 2019; Girardi, 2019). As shown in this section, the renminbi 
has also been adopted as an alternative to the dollar. Even though the Chinese state is 
sanctioning this process, to a large extent, firms and banks have been actively creating 
the routes to this development. 
5.2 Pecuniary transaction costs 
5.2.1. Cyclical dollar shortage in the 2008 crisis 
During the 2008 crisis, the international monetary system witnessed a dollar shortage in 
interbank and foreign exchange markets. Either because financial institutions were 
concerned about their future dollar funds or the creditworthiness of their counterparts, 
after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008 financial institutions were 
unwilling to extend dollar credit to each other. Their behavior reflected interest rate 
levels, which soared in the last quarter of 2008 (McCauley and McGuire, 2009). 
This crisis affected banks' capacity to lend even to financially healthy 
enterprises. As Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show, between the last quarter of 2007 
and 2008, bank lending decreased by 79% for large corporate borrowers. As banks, 
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especially non-US ones, heavily rely on short-term debt rather than time-deposits to 
fund their credit operations, the freezing of interbank markets undermined banks' 
abilities to expand or even roll over debts for their clients. 
The impact of the temporary dollar credit crunch was especially harmful to 
international trade. Many authors have already pointed out that, as well as the decline in 
demand during the 2008 crisis, inadequate trade finance supply and costly interest rates 
were also responsible for export decline (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Auboin, 2009; 
Coulibaly et al., 2013). According to Auboin (2009), during the crisis, the letter of 
credit spread for emerging economies increased from an average of 10-16 points to 250-
500. As most of the global trade depends on some form of trade finance, it is not 
surprising that studies estimate that 15% to 20% of international trade decline was due 
to credit shock (Clark, 2014). 
While the banking credit crunch was a global phenomenon, emerging market 
economies faced additional challenges—capital outflows, the volatility of exchange 
rates, and foreign reserves decline—that accentuated their dollar shortage problem. 
Unlike developed economies, which had a readily available dollar liquidity supply 
through the FED SWAP agreements (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2020), most emerging market economies had much less access to short-term 
crisis finance.  
Companies, banks, governments, and central banks all tried to find solutions to 
mitigate this dollar shortage. From an individual perspective, some firms were able to 
rely on credit from suppliers (Coulibaly et al., 2013). From a governmental standpoint, 
many countries, including China, used public banks to ease trade finance conditions 
(Chauffour and Farole, 2009; Malouche, 2009). 
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Another institutional response to the credit crunch was to allow the cross-border 
use of local currencies. As explained in section 4.2.3, interviews with PBOC senior 
officials and leadership speeches show that the catalyst for renminbi cross-border 
transactions was the 2008 credit crunch.36 Although dollar credit conditions improved 
after 2009, instability is an intrinsic characteristic of capitalist economies, and “it” can 
always happen again (Minsky, 2016). But for the next time, the possibility for firms and 
banks to use the renminbi as an alternative is already open. 
5.2.2. Non-cyclical dollar shortage in peripheral countries 
Another dollar-related tendency that contributes to renminbi adoption is the dollar 
shortage in peripheral economies. According to Bai Yi, senior staff from Huawei, 
adopting the renminbi for cross-border operations solved the problem of customers’ 
repayment in countries with dollar shortages. He cited the case of America Movil, 
which in 2012 issued RMB 1 billion bonds in Hong Kong to repay Huawei’s equipment 
purchases (Global Capital, 2012; PBOC, 2014).  Companies and banks from peripheral 
countries with current account deficits may have worse financial conditions for taking 
dollar credit. When these companies have commercial ties with China, as America 
Movil does, it may be less expensive to use the renminbi directly.  
Table 4 below summarizes the types of event that increase the transaction costs 
of using the dollar. As section 5 demonstrates, the increased adoption of the renminbi 
cannot be explained exclusively by the Chinese policies, but is also due to the higher 
pecuniary transaction costs related to the cyclical instability of international finance and 
dollar shortage in peripheral countries. Moreover, the imposition of US financial 
sanctions on Chinese trade partners impelled some companies to rely on the renminbi 
payment network. Although these events have not threatened the dollar's prominence in 
 
36 1) Shanghai, November 2018, and 2) Beijing, October 2019. 
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international markets, it has produced spillover effects on the adoption of other 
currencies, including the renminbi. 
Table 4- Summary of events increasing dollar transaction costs 
 Events Impacts 
Access to Payment 
System Financial Sanctions 
Restrict non-residents access to the 




Cyclical Instability of 
Finance 
Increases borrowing costs during the 
crisis 
Low inflow of dollars on 
peripheral economies 
 




Despite the challenges for new entrants into the hall of international currencies, in the 
last 10 years, the renminbi has expanded its international use, climbing from the 35th to 
the 5th most used currency for international payments. In addition, despite the 
advantages of the dollar as the incumbent monetary power, renminbi cross-border 
operations between China and the rest of the world have increased at the expense of the 
dollar share. Why have actors decided to change from an already established and 
competitive currency to a new entrant? This article finds that, apart from China’s 
policies to promote renminbi internationalization, various obstacles to using the dollar 
for international operations are impelling economic actors to search for new 
alternatives, the renminbi being one of these. Among these obstacles, the most notable 
are American financial sanctions on Chinese commercial partners, the cyclical 
instability of international finance, and the dollar shortage in peripheral countries.  
This article not only sheds light on external factors for countries that lead to 
currency internationalization of new entrants, but also posits a model that explains the 
mechanisms of currency competition. I show that changes in currencies' transaction 
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costs induce actors to readjust their choices, by giving preference to a currency with 
lower transaction costs.  
More than ever before, “this is the golden age of economic statecraft” (Drezner, 
2015 p. 755), and this article gives evidence for a novel aspect of how nations are 
employing statecraft. Armijo and Katada (2015) have shown how states can defend 
themselves from or influence other states and market conditions. I show here that states 
have also begun to create tools to neutralize the side-effects of other countries' financial 
statecraft. Furthermore, this article also shows that financial statecraft is much more 
organically developed than previously thought. For instance, Farrell and Newman 
(2019) have demonstrated how states with authority over strategic networks can impose 
financial statecraft, and have also pointed out that affected states may find alternatives 
to mitigate their vulnerability. I show that commercial actors play an active and creative 
role in this process. Although sanctioned and supported by the Chinese state, to a large 
extent firms and banks were themselves responsible for crafting new channels through 
which to bypass American financial statecraft.  
This research brings insight to the prospects for renminbi internationalization, 
the dollar's status, and the efficiency of American statecraft. As yet, there is no 
indication that the dollar's dominance is jeopardized. However, the tendency of firms, 
banks, and states to find channels to bypass financial sanctions can put the efficiency of 
this coercive measure at risk.  Regarding the renminbi's status, as yet, neither the 
Chinese efforts nor the problems with using the dollar in the international context have 
been sufficient to project the renminbi to the position of a new incumbent currency. In 
fact, overthrowing the dollar's status does not seem to be the Chinese leadership's goal. 
The PBOC leadership has repeatedly announced that renminbi use in the international 
market should be around 10-15%, reflecting the country’s weight in the world economy. 
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This does not mean, however, that Chinese policymakers’ actions have been innocuous. 
On the contrary, renminbi cross-border use has had the very practical effect of shielding 
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Table 1. Offshore Renminbi Clearing Centers 
Source: PBOC (2019, 2020). 
  
  Region Since Bank 
1 Hong Kong Dec. 2003 Bank of China (Hong Kong) 
2 Macau Sept. 2004 Bank of China Macau Branch 
3 Taiwan Dec. 2012 Bank of China Taipei Branch 
4 Singapore Feb. 2013 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Singapore Branch 
5 United Kingdom June 2014 China Construction Bank (London)  
6 Germany June 2014 Bank of China Frankfurt Branch 
7 South Korea July 2014 Bank of Communications Seoul Branch 
8 France Sept. 2014 Bank of China Paris Branch 
9 Luxembourg Sept. 2014 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Luxembourg Branch 
10 Qatar Nov. 2014 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Doha Branch 
11 Canada Nov. 2014 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Canada) 
12 Australia Nov. 2014 Bank of China Sydney Branch 
13 Malaysia Jan. 2015 Bank of China (Malaysia) 
14 Thailand Jan. 2015 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Thailand) 
15 Chile May 2015 China Construction Bank Chile Branch 
16 Hungary June 2015 Bank of China Limited Hungarian Branch 
17 South Africa July 2015 Bank of China Johannesburg Branch 
18 Argentina Sept. 2015 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Argentina) 
19 Zambia Sept. 2015 Bank of China (Zambia)  
20 Switzerland Nov. 2015 China Construction Bank Zurich Branch 
21 United States Sept. 2016 Bank of China New York Branch 
22 Russia Sept. 2016 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Moscow) 
23 
United Arab 
Emirates Dec. 2016 Agricultural Bank of China Dubai Branch 
24 United States Feb. 2018 JP Morgan Chase & Co. 
25 Japan Oct. 2018 Bank of China Tokyo Branch 
  May 2019 Mitsubishi UFJ Bank 
26 Philippines Sept. 2019 Bank of China Manila Branch 
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Table 2. Interviews conducted during fieldwork 
Institution Role Place Date Language of 
interview 
Ministry of Commerce Former director of 
department 
Beijing Oct. 2019 Chinese 
People's Bank of China  Senior official Shanghai Nov. 2018 Chinese and 
English 
People's Bank of China  Senior official Beijing Oct. 2019 English 
Bank of China  Branch director Shanghai Sep. 2019 Chinese 
Bank of Communications  Research analyst Shanghai Sep. 2019 Chinese 
China Construction Bank  Analyst Shanghai Sep. 2019 Chinese 
Bank of Kunlun  
 
Accounting manager Beijing Oct.  2019 Chinese 
Pet products supplier 
(Chinese owned) 
Accounting manager  Shanghai Sep. 2019 Chinese 
Ship building company 
(Chinese owned) 




CFO Zhuhai Oct. 2018 English 
Industrial pump company 
(Chinese Owned) 
Sales staff Hangzhou Nov. 2018 English 
New Development Bank Senior official Shanghai Sep. 2019 Portuguese 
China Development Bank  Foreign relations 
official 
Beijing  Sep. 2019 English 
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